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ABSTRACT
The participation of directors on more than one board is called “board interlocking”. This phenomenon contributes to the 
spread of management and governance practices, through directors sharing their knowledge and experiences on other 
boards. Thus, directors could “carry” the earnings management practices present in one company into another in which 
they sit on the board. It is assumed that the greater directors’ direct or indirect connections on boards, the greater the 
sharing of information, especially information that can be reflected in company earnings quality. In light of the above, the 
aim of this study is to verify the influence of board interlocking on earnings management in companies listed on the São 
Paulo Stock, Commodities, and Futures Exchange (BM&FBovespa). The study is characterized as descriptive, quantitative, 
and documentary, and uses a sample of companies listed on the BM&FBOVESPA between 2011 and 2013. For earnings 
management, the model from Kang and Sivaramakrishnan (1995) was used, while for interlocking, degree centrality measures 
were used for direct board member connections, and intermediation centrality for indirect connections. The results indicate 
that earnings management is influenced by the interlocking of board members. It is concluded that the greater the degree 
centrality, the greater positive earnings management is, and that variations in positive and negative accruals are influenced 
by board member intermediation. The results reinforce the idea that earnings management behavior can be transferred 
between companies by the directors that make up their boards.
Keywords: board interlocking, board of directors, earnings management, degree centrality, intermediation centrality.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In a corporate environment represented by managers 
and shareholders, stock market growth and the spread of 
capital ultimately favor manager autonomy, with managers 
taking decisions that are aligned with their own interests 
(Ribeiro & Colauto, 2016; Santos & Silveira, 2007) and 
that are sometimes not necessarily the same as those 
of shareholders. Agency theory discusses this confl ict, 
with Fama and Jensen (1983) arguing that boards of 
directors are responsible for monitoring and mediating 
in this confl icting environment. In the view of Comet 
and Pizzaro (2011), along with this monitoring, boards 
are responsible for controlling the decisions taken by 
chairmen and chief executives, with the aim of defending 
shareholder interests. Confl icts of agency are common in 
the corporate environment from the moment the agent 
and principal in an organization have diﬀ erent objectives.
Boards of directors play an essential role in corporate 
governance, in which the legal prerogatives imposed on 
them range from hiring and fi ring to establishing manager 
compensation (Bruére, 2010; Williamson, 1985). Th eir 
role is to ensure equal treatment of shareholders and to 
intermediate between shareholder interests and manager 
practices, which thus makes boards important monitoring 
agents (Brenes, Madrigal & Requena, 2011; Campbell, 
Ghosh, Petrova & Sirmans, 2011).
Th e role of monitoring and reconciling manager 
actions with shareholder interests is strongly related with 
board independence. According to Fama and Jensen 
(1983) and Christensen, Kent, and Stewart (2010), board 
independence can be seen as a good corporate governance 
tool, contributing to greater monitoring of the practices 
adopted by managers. For Monks and Minow (1996), one 
of the main pillars of corporate governance is a strong 
board presence and composition in which there is member 
independence. 
This context of board member composition can 
involve the participation of one member on more than 
one board. Th e literature calls this corporate practice 
“board interlocking”; that is, when a board member of 
one company sits on the board of another (Burt, 1979; 
Mizruchi, 1996). For Shropshire (2010), interlocking 
can be defi ned as director overlay, creating a network 
structure that can influence management decisions 
by sharing knowledge and experiences. For Hashim 
and Rahman (2011) and Shi, Dharwadkar, and Harris 
(2013), board interlocking can spread management and 
governance practices through the sharing of knowledge 
and experiences, which can be refl ected in company 
earnings quality. 
Company earnings quality reflects manager 
decisions and discretionary practices, which can involve 
management taking decisions opportunistically in order to 
maximize earnings without presenting the reality to other 
users. For Almeida (2010), earnings quality is relevant 
for understanding the incentives that infl uence executives 
and shareholders into interfering in the measurement of 
earnings and how these agents are infl uenced by such 
incentives, given that it is them who are responsible for the 
discretion involved in accounting choices. Martinez (2001) 
states that this practice is fundamentally characterized as 
an intentional alteration in accounting results, the aim 
of which is to achieve a particular motivation. It does 
not involve accounting fraud, as it is permitted under 
legislation and left  to the judgment of each manager. 
Th e presence of board interlocking can infl uence the 
adoption of discretionary practices that characterize 
earnings management. Earnings management is a process 
in which decisions are limited to the impositions of 
accounting rules in order to present a desired level of 
earnings (Schipper, 1989; Shi et al., 2013) that can benefi t 
shareholders and managers. 
Earnings management observed via board interlocking 
has a contagion effect on companies; that is, the 
participation of some members in other companies leads 
to good and bad management practices being shared 
between companies (Chiu, Teoh & Tian, 2013).
Studies demonstrate a connection between earnings 
management practices and interconnections between 
board members (Carrera, 2013; Chiu et al., 2013; Mindzak, 
2013; Shi et al., 2013). In the context of North American 
companies there are the studies from Carrera (2013) and 
Chiu et al., (2013). Mindzak (2013) conducted a study 
on Canadian companies and Shi et al. (2013) verifi ed the 
relationship between interlocking boards of directors and 
audit committees in the North American setting. In Brazil, 
Ribeiro and Colauto (2016) related the interlocking of 
boards of directors with earnings management via income 
smoothing, however this relationship did not occur using 
the model from Kang and Sivaramakrishnan (1995) (KS 
Model) for verifying earnings management. Based on this 
context, in which the interconnection of board members 
can transfer the management practice experiences of the 
companies of which they sit on the board, and which can 
include earnings management, the following research 
problem is presented: what is the infl uence of board 
interlocking on earnings management in companies 
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listed on the São Paulo Stock, Commodities, and Futures 
Exchange (BM&FBOVESPA)? Th e aim of the study 
consists of verifying the infl uence of board interlocking 
on earnings management in companies listed on the 
BM&FBOVESPA.
Th e study is warranted by the evolution of social 
networks and is relevant due to the importance of 
researching possible information transfers via board 
member interlocking, given the lack of empirical studies 
of this type in the area of accounting (Shi et al., 2013). For 
Chiu et al. (2013), by observing earnings management 
based on a social network, in this case board members, 
it can be identifi ed why and when the context of this 
network is important for earnings quality, showing that the 
quality of information passed on infl uences the chances 
of earnings quality being aﬀ ected. 
Researching the interlocking of audit committees and 
boards of directors, Carrera (2013) aﬃ  rms that studies 
such as these also provide insights based on Agency 
Th eory; that is, the participation of a director on more 
than one board means that he/she does not have the 
time and resources necessary to eﬀ ectively monitor an 
organization’s objectives. 
Th e study is also warranted for contributing to research 
in the area of corporate governance and social networks, 
since it seeks to investigate corporate interlocking and its 
relationship with earnings management, based on the 
exchange of information and knowledge of accounting 
practices originating from board member participation 
in more than one company. For Wong, Gigax, and Wang 
(2015), ignoring the essence of how relationship networks 
behave can result in unreliable statistics and incorrect 
conclusions being drawn.
Th e article is structured in the following way: section 
2 presents the national and international literature review 
regarding board interlocking and earnings management, 
as well as the construction of the hypotheses of the study. 
Section 3 describes the methodology applied. Section 4 
discusses the results from the statistical tests applied, and 
section 5 presents the conclusion.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Board of Director Interlocking
Ownership structure and conflicts of interest 
have always formed part of discussions on corporate 
governance. Corporate governance can be considered as 
an integrated set of internal and external controls aiming to 
harmonize shareholder and manager objectives (Baysinger 
& Hoskisson, 1990) so that there are no confl icts of interest 
resulting from the separation between ownership and 
control (Berle & Means, 1932; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Th e context of corporate governance practices includes 
the board of directors as a body that mediates in the 
confl ict of interests between managers and shareholders. 
For Campbell et al. (2011), the board of directors is an 
important monitoring agent, particularly in corporate 
events in which managers’ interests are tangential to 
shareholders’ interests. The challenge for all board 
members is aligning business strategy with shareholder 
interests, in an environment in which shareholders aim 
to obtain value in the long run, while top management 
seeks growth and increased valuation in the short run 
(Brenes et al., 2011). 
Considered an important mechanism of corporate 
governance, board performance in the eyes of managers 
is monitored based on their reputation in the market 
(Fama, 1980). Mace (1986) suggests that prestigious 
boards with possibilities for good business contacts can 
lead to the search for external members, resulting in 
members sitting on more than one board, infl uencing 
the size and independence of these boards. 
Although there should be equilibrium in board size, 
in which there are internal and external members, the 
participation of internal members has been compromised 
by company interests, while external participation means 
meetings and decisions do not evolve (Salmon, 2001). On 
the other hand, Hsu and Petshsakulwong (2010) assert 
that external board members are more likely to dispute 
company interests due to them not having any economic 
relationship with management. Th us, the participation of 
independent board members produces improvements in 
earnings quality, thus reducing information asymmetry 
(Goh, Ng & Young, 2012). It is observed that research on 
board of director independence has evolved and that this 
independence contributes to reducing agency problems, 
improving corporate governance practices (Carrera, 2013) 
and creating shareholder value (Hoitash, 2011).
It is noted that the authors, in addressing board 
independence, relate the external participation of 
directors and when they sit on more than one board 
and there is board interlocking; that is, when a member 
of a company board occupies a position on the board of 
another company.
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For decades, the practice of board interlocking has 
been quite a widely debated issue in corporate governance. 
In the United States of America, in 1914, Act n. 8 of 
Clayton, which aimed to prohibit competing companies 
from interlinking via corporate networks, did not 
achieve the desired success, since it lacked mechanisms 
for condemning this corporate practice. In 1992, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) required 
all companies to report board interlocking in light of 
concerns about executive remuneration (Fich & White, 
2005).
In practice, board interlocking occurs in all sectors 
and has mostly been praised due to it mobilizing a 
scarce resource in organizations: manager and director 
experience (Fich & White, 2005). For Nawfal (2011), large 
companies tend to present a greater number of interlocks, 
due to the experience, ability, and skills of their board 
members. Th us, Connelly, Johnson, Tihanyi, and Ellstrand 
(2011) aﬃ  rm that being a member of a board of directors 
can benefi t companies through external information 
communication channels. 
Chiu et al. (2013) explain that most studies have sought 
to investigate the corporate behavior of organizations 
in diﬀ erent areas of earnings behavior based on board 
interlocking. In Brazil, the research addresses the issue 
in terms of company legitimacy and value (Rossoni & 
Machado-da-Silva, 2013), political connections (Brey, 
Camilo, Marcon & Alberton, 2011; Brey, Camilo, Marcon 
& Bandeira-de-Mello, 2012; Camilo, Marcon & Bandeira-
de-Melo, 2012; Costa, Bandeira-de-Melo & Marcon, 2013; 
Macedo, Silva & Machado, 2015), company reputation 
(Rossoni & Guarrido, 2015), and earnings management 
(Ribeiro & Colauto, 2016).
Rossoni and Machado-da-Silva (2013) evaluated how 
legitimacy conditions the market value of companies 
listed on the BM&FBOVESPA. The board of an 
organization’s position, resulting from board interlocking, 
was considered as being the origin of cultural-cognitive 
legitimacy. Rossoni and Machado-da-Silva (2013) argue 
that good board members tend to participate in a greater 
number of organizations, with the centrality and position 
of these members in a network revealing evidence of their 
prestige as executives, which thus means they are better 
positioned in the network and have a greater ability to 
access privileged information and resources. 
Studies regarding interconnections between companies 
in the national setting are more comprehensive when they 
discuss them from the perspective of political connections. 
Brey et al. (2011) observed the relevance of political 
connections and ownership structure for the survival 
of organizations. Later, Brey et al. (2012) readdress the 
discussion of political connections by considering the 
interaction between Political Strategy Th eory and Agency 
Th eory, seeking to further examine the eﬀ ects of political 
connections via ownership structure and the presence of 
the government as a shareholder. 
Camilo et al. (2012) studied political connections 
and their eﬀ ects on company performance using three 
proxies: donations to political campaigns, the hiring of 
members with political backgrounds to compose executive 
boards or boards of directors, and board interlocking 
activities. Costa et al. (2013) verifi ed the infl uence of 
political connections in the diversifi cation of Brazilian 
business groups.
Macedo et al. (2015) examined the issue from an 
analyst perspective and whether they would be likely to 
maintain their portfolios of investments in companies 
that have explicit political connections.
In an approach involving corporate reputation, 
Rossoni and Guarido (2015) analyzed how diﬀ erent 
markets (status), boards of directors, and organizational 
characteristics condition the reputation of publicly-
traded Brazilian companies. Th e authors show that one 
of the ways of evaluating a board is via the structure of 
relationships between members, which is characterized 
as board interlocking, and in which good members are 
believed to participate in more organizations, which 
creates networks of relationships that can generate prestige. 
Also in the national setting, the issue of board 
interlocking and earnings management was addressed 
by the study from Ribeiro and Colauto (2016), who 
related board interlocking with earnings management 
via income smoothing, unlike in this study, which 
verifi es the infl uence of board interlocking on earnings 
management via variations in discretionary accruals using 
the KS Model. Th ere have been other perspectives in the 
international arena, such as the studies from Carrera 
(2013), Chiu et al. (2013), Mindzak (2013), and Shi et 
al. (2013).
Chiu et al. (2013) found strong evidence that earnings 
management is transferred from company to company 
through the external relationships of board members, chief 
executive oﬃ  cers (CEOs), and audit committee members. 
Th ey used panel data regression, identifying relationship 
networks based on degree centrality, intermediation, and 
proximity. Carrera (2013) related interlocking between 
audit committees and boards of directors with earnings 
management, using 13,065 observations of American 
companies between 2003 and 2010, and concluded that 
centralities measured via board member interlocking are 
positively associated with earnings management.
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Mindzak (2013) analyzed the formation of board 
interlocking and earnings management in Canadian 
companies. Aft er analyzing 120 medium-sized companies, 
he was able to aﬃ  rm that the interlinked companies 
presented less earnings management than the non-
interlinked companies; that is, when interlinked, board 
members have a positive eﬀ ect on earnings quality and 
long term company performance. Shi et al. (2013) sought 
to relate the interlocking of audit committees and boards 
of directors with earnings management. For the authors, 
the results are strongly inconsistent with the idea that 
similar companies simply select similar directors (even 
the same directors) and are strongly consistent with the 
theory of information transfer networks. Th e authors’ 
fi ndings support the hypothesis that companies do not 
need to belong to the same sector or fi eld of activity for 
there to be board interlocking.
2.2 Earnings Management
It is observed that earnings management has become 
one of the main themes in the area of accounting and 
fi nance in the last decades (Santos & Paulo, 2006). On the 
other hand, Trapp (2009) points out that there is extensive 
international literature on the subject, and that in Brazil 
it became the object of studies aft er Martinez (2001).
Earnings management, according to the defi nition 
from Schipper (1989, p. 92), is “intentional intervention in 
the external fi nancial statement information process, with 
the aim of obtaining some private benefi t (unlike in the 
neutral process of reporting fi nancial results)”. Schipper 
(1989) comments that this defi nition limits the discussion 
regarding earnings management when it includes only 
external communication of accounting statements and 
does not mention statements of a managerial nature.
Roychowdhury (2006) discusses management of 
operating activities, in which managers seek to develop 
actions that deviate from best accounting practices, with 
the aim of reporting better results in a diﬀ erent context 
and thus meeting their possible needs. For the author, 
decisions based on operating activities aﬀ ect company 
cash fl ow and can also aﬀ ect discretionary accruals. Along 
this same line of thinking, Kuo, Ning, and Song (2014) 
argue that management based on operating activities is 
related to governance mechanisms, in which strong and 
eﬀ ective governance tends to increase investor protection 
and the quality of fi nancial information, intensifying 
control in the capital market.
For Martinez (2001), it is important to understand 
that earnings management is not accounting fraud; that 
is, manager discretion is used when the rules give the 
option of applying this or that procedure and accounting 
choices are made that do not refl ect business reality, but 
instead refl ect incentives that lead to a diﬀ erent result 
being desired.
Despite not involving frauds or illicit acts, earnings 
management can negatively aﬀ ect the primary function 
of accounting statements, which is to provide useful and 
reliable information for the user decision-making process 
(Fuji, 2004), in which income is one of the various signals 
used when taking decisions and making judgments. 
In light of the above, the diﬀ erence between cash basis 
accounting and accrual basis accounting lies in the timing 
of recognizing revenues and expenses. For Martinez (2001, 
p.16), accruals are defi ned as “the diﬀ erence between net 
income and net cash fl ow”; that is, they would be “all of the 
income statement items included in income calculations, 
but which do not necessarily imply fund movements”.
Since Healy (1985), the literature has addressed the 
methodology of verifying total accruals, which are divided 
into discretionary and non discretionary. For Goulart 
(2007, p. 43), “they are considered discretionary when 
they depend on the judgment of those preparing the 
fi nancial statements”. Th e choice of depreciation method 
is discretionary and it is in discretionary accruals that 
components of earnings management can be found, when 
in fact they should be used to provide truthful information 
on companies to the market (Trapp, 2009).
Discretionary accruals can be used as a measure of 
earnings management, in that the greater accruals are, 
the stronger or more evident earnings management is. 
Th us, positive (negative) accruals indicate an interest 
in increasing (decreasing) income or improving 
(reducing) results (Goulart, 2007). Martinez (2001) adds 
that discretionary accruals have the aim of managing 
accounting earnings. 
In order to fi nd total accruals (discretionary and non 
discretionary accruals), these can be calculated using 
information extracted from the Balance Sheet, from the 
Income Statement, and from the Cash Flow Statement 
(Goulart, 2007; Martinez, 2001; Paulo, 2007), in which 
various models can be used to measure variations in 
discretionary accruals, although no one model that can be 
considered as perfect. In this study the KS Model is used.
For Martinez (2001), perhaps because it involves a large 
number of variables and data, the KS Model is considered 
to be the most complete, both in an accounting sense, 
because it more eﬃ  ciently describes the process of defi ning 
accruals, and in terms of statistical precision. However, for 
Martinez (2011), one of the biggest diﬃ  culties in adopting 
the model is in preparing data for multiple regression, 
due to its robustness and the quantity of accounting data 
that needs to be collected.
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Also for Martinez (2008, p.12), “out of all the current 
modern techniques the KS Model is the one that provides 
the best results” which is consistent with Thomas 
and Zhang (2001, p.364), who reviewed six earnings 
management models and also concluded that the KS 
Model is the most precise and the one that best adjusts 
to data treatment.
2.3 Board Interlocking and Earnings 
Management
Corporate governance presents mechanisms that 
contribute to the monitoring of managers, the board of 
directors being considered one of the main ones. Th is 
mechanism is responsible for implanting and monitoring 
strategic guidelines and relevant decisions in companies 
(Santos & Silveira, 2007).
When companies are strategically aligned with others, 
they tend to share board members, and, in turn, can adopt 
similar organizational practices (Ribeiro & Colauto, 2016). 
Th is phenomenon occurs, according to Chiu et al. (2013), 
as a result of observing behavior regarding the adoption of 
a particular action or the result generated by the chosen 
action. Companies can adopt similar organizational 
practices to others through the social ties that are created 
and by observing the actions and results adopted these 
other companies. In addition to this, the social ties created 
by companies through sharing board members can favor 
information exchanges between companies and the spread 
of diﬀ erent organizational practices. 
These different organizational practices include 
earnings management, which can involve diﬀ erent types, 
such as: target earnings, income smoothing, big bath 
accounting (Martinez, 2008), observed via companies’ 
discretionary accruals (the diﬀ erence between net income 
and operating cash fl ow) (Mendes-Da-Silva, Onusic & 
Bergmann, 2014), or via operating decisions that infl uence 
company cash fl ow (Martinez & Cardoso, 2009).
It bears mentioning that corporate governance 
mechanisms and the sharing of board members can have an 
infl uence on companies adopting diﬀ erent organizational 
practices, one of which is earnings management. 
According to Ribeiro and Colauto (2016), the sharing of 
board members between companies favors the spread of 
earnings management both through operating decisions 
and through discretionary practices related to income. 
International and national authors have been concerned 
with this issue and have investigated the relationship 
between corporate governance mechanisms and board 
interlocking and diﬀ erent types of earnings management. 
Dechow and Skinner (2000) argue that organizations 
with weak governance structures are more likely to 
develop earnings management practices. Th e study from 
Xie, Davidson, and Dadalt (2003) aimed to examine the 
role of boards of directors, of audit committees, and of 
executive boards in preventing earnings management. Th e 
fi ndings enabled them to infer that boards of directors, 
audit committee members, and the activities carried out 
by audit committees are relevant factors that limit the 
readiness of board members to be involved in earnings 
management. 
In the study from Chen, Elder, and Hsieh (2007), 
the aim was to investigate whether the characteristics 
of corporate governance are associated with earnings 
management in companies based in Taiwan. Among the 
results, they observed that board of director independence 
and expertise are associated with a lower probability of 
earnings management being carried out. Moreover, the 
study revealed that the enactment of the principles of good 
corporate governance practices resulted in a reduction 
in earnings management.
With regards to the studies that have evaluated the 
relationship between the sharing of board members 
(board interlocking) and earnings management, Chiu 
et al. (2013) evaluated whether earnings management 
(via discretionary accounts) spreads from company to 
company via board of director connections in companies 
in the United States of America. Th e results demonstrate 
that companies that share board members are more 
susceptible to manipulating earnings. Th ey also verifi ed 
that the spread of earnings management practices within 
companies with board interlocking is more intense when 
board members in leadership positions are shared, such 
as chairmen of the board.
In the national context, Ribeiro and Colauto (2016) 
analyzed the relationship between board interlocking and 
earnings management (income smoothing) in companies 
listed in the Bovespa Index. Th e fi ndings revealed strong 
indications that board interlocking infl uences companies 
into manipulating their earnings via income smoothing. 
In general, they found that companies that share members 
with other organizations engage in diﬀ erent earnings 
management practices, which compromise the quality 
of the accounting information reported. 
In light of this context, it is observed via empirical 
evidence from national and international studies that 
corporate governance and board interlocking have an 
infl uence on the adoption of diﬀ erent earnings management 
practices. With regards to board interlocking, this appears 
to be associated with the spread of earnings management 
between companies that share board members, and leads 
to the construction of the hypotheses.
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2.4 Construction of the Hypotheses
Connelly et al. (2011) highlight that interlocking aims 
to share knowledge and information and plays a crucial 
role in determining company strategies and overcoming 
investor uncertainty.
For Borgatti and Foster (2003), reducing uncertainty 
is also associated with strategic choices, in which board 
interlocking arises as an essential element, leading 
managers to observe the behavior of other companies 
and imitate and learn from their successes or failures. 
Thus, board member sharing and good accounting 
and governance practices are reflected in company 
performance and ultimately increase market value, thus 
benefi tting shareholders (Yeo, Pochet & Alcouﬀ e, 2003).
Gulati and Westphal (1999) indicate that board 
interlocking oﬀ ers a unique opportunity for linking up 
in order to exchange information, observe the leadership 
practices and style of pears, and witness the consequences 
of these practices fi rst hand, and that the greater a board 
member’s degree of centrality, the greater the probability 
of strategic cooperation between companies.  
For Gulati and Westphal (1999), board interlocking 
is treated in a positive way, facilitating cohesion and 
the exchange of information between companies, and 
ignoring heterogeneity the more an information channel 
generates trust between board members. Th erefore, it is 
understood that the greater the number of links between 
companies, the greater the exchange of information 
and experiences will be, which can even improve the 
accounting practices adopted. Wasserman and Faust 
(1994) state that the number of links between the actors 
in a network is measured by degree centrality. Th is is one 
of the main measures used in social studies. Freeman 
(1979) highlights that degree is simple and measured by 
the number of direct links involving a particular node or 
member in a network. Degree centrality is the simplest and 
most direct of the measures of centrality; that is, it reveals 
the number of links that an actor, in this case a board 
member, has with other board members in a network.
In light of the opinion that with board interlocking 
information is shared and that, according to Carrera 
(2013), there is a positive relationship between degree 
centrality and earnings management, and that the greater 
the number of connections between board members, the 
greater the degree of management, we have the following 
hypotheses:
H1a: the greater the degree centrality, the greater positive 
earnings management is;
H1b: the greater the degree centrality, the greater negative 
earnings management is.
Another measure of centrality normally used 
in network studies is intermediation centrality. 
Intermediation centrality aims to interlink actors who 
are not directly connected, demonstrating the importance 
of these intermediate actors in channeling information 
fl ows to other actors in a network (Freeman, 1979). 
Via intermediation centrality, small companies tend to 
interconnect themselves with large companies in order 
to reduce strategic uncertainties. Intermediation of 
interconnected boards channels information to central 
companies via the shortest path between the actors in a 
network (Elouaer-Mrizak & Chastand, 2013).
Th e use of intermediation centrality can be considered 
as one of the most powerful measures of relationship 
intensity between companies (Elouaer-Mrizak & Chastand, 
2013). Companies interlinked via board interlocking are 
potential conductor wires for the sharing of information 
that can lead to earnings management behavior (Chiu et al., 
2013). For Carrera (2013), variations in levels of earnings 
management are related to the degree of intermediation 
of the members in a network. As can be perceived, once 
board members simultaneously belong to other boards, 
they have the opportunity to communicate and exchange 
information. Via intermediation centrality, information 
and accounting practices are also indirectly shared, which 
leads us to also test the following hypotheses:
H2a: the greater the intermediation centrality, the greater 
positive earnings management is;
H2b: the greater the intermediation centrality, the greater 
negative earnings management is.
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3. RESEARCH METHODS AND PROCEDURES
3.1 Population and Sample
Th e study is characterized as descriptive, quantitative, 
and documentary. Th e population is comprised of non-
fi nancial companies that compose the Brazilian capital 
market between 2011 and 2013, totaling 358 companies 
divided between nine diﬀ erent sectors, according to the 
BM&FBOVESPA classifi cation. 
Th e sample was composed by studying the Reference 
Forms and item 12.6/8 of the 358 companies, available on 
the BM&FBOVESPA website. First, the companies and 
active board members were tabulated. Th en the companies 
with board members participating on other company 
boards were identifi ed in order to compose the study 
sample for board interlocking.
It was found that 246 companies had one or more 
members on their boards who sat on the boards of other 
companies, thus resulting in board interlocking.
Of these 246 companies, it was verifi ed that some did 
not present all of the information needed to apply the 
KS Model in order to calculate earnings management, 
resulting in a sample of 185 companies for 2011, 202 for 
2012, and 201 for 2013. Table 1 shows the population 
and study sample.
Table 1 Population and study sample
Sector
Population
(n)
Sample with 
board interlocking
(n)
Sample with board interlocking and information 
for calculating earnings management
(n)
2011 2012 2013
Industrial goods 35 21 17 19 19
Construction and transport 70 53 35 39 39
Cyclical consumption 68 43 34 34 34
Non-cyclical consumption 45 29 20 22 21
Basic materials 40 26 18 20 20
Oil, gas, and biofuels 7 3 2 3 3
Information technology 9 3 3 3 3
Telecommunications 10 7 6 6 6
Public utility 74 61 50 56 56
Total 358 246 185 202 201
Source: Developed by the authors.
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For Table 1 it is observed that board member 
participation in more than one company is considerable. 
Out of the 358 non-fi nancial companies, 246 have one 
or more board members belonging to other company 
boards; that is, 68% of the non-fi nancial companies listed 
on the BM&FBOVESPA feature the formation of board 
interlocking.
It is perceived that the sector practicing interlocking 
the most is the public utilities sector, represented by almost 
83%, in which 62 companies were identifi ed as having 
the characteristics of interconnected boards. On the other 
hand, the sector with the lowest proportion in the sample 
is information technology, with 33% of the companies. 
3.2 Study Variables
In order to carry out the study, the panel data regression 
model was used, represented by the regression described 
in equation 1. Both the dependent and independent 
variables were obtained for each company (i) and for 
each year analyzed (t).
ACDit = β0 + β1DEGREE_Cit + β2BTWN_Cit + β3INDEPit + β4SIZEit + β5DUALCEOit +
 β6MEETit + β7COMPENSit + β8FIRM_SIZEit + β9GOVit + β10SECTORit + εit
Th e dependent variable ACDit (discretionary accruals of company i in year t) is found via equation 2 (KS 
Model)
ATit = ϕ0 + ϕ1(δRit) + ϕ2(δ2Eit) + ϕ3(δ3PPEit) + εit
in which ATit = total accruals of company i in period t, 
weighted by total assets at the end of period t-1; Rit = 
net revenues of company i in period t, weighted by total 
assets at the end of period t-1; Eit = amount of costs and 
operating expenses of company i in period t, excluding 
depreciation and amortization expenses, weighted by total 
assets at the end of period t-1; PPEit = balance of fi xed 
asset accounts (gross) of company i at the end of period 
t, weighted by total assets at the end of period t-1; δ1,it = 
CRi,t-1/Ri,t-1; δ2,it = (INVi,t-1 + PreExpi,t-1 + CPi,t-1)/Ei,t-1; δ3,it = 
Depri,t-1/PPEi,t-1; CRi,t-1 = balance of (client) receivables of 
company i in period t, weighted by total assets at the end 
of period t-1; Ri,t-1 = net revenue of company i in period 
t-1; INVi,t-1 = balance of stock of company i in period 
t-1; PreExi,t-1 = balance of prepaid expenses of company 
i in period t-1; Depri,t-1 = amount of depreciation and 
amortization expenses of company i in period t-1; PPEi,t-1 
= balance of fi xed assets and deferred assets (gross) of 
company i at the end of period t-1; ϕ0, ϕ1, ϕ2 and ϕ3 = 
estimated coeﬃ  cients from the regression; εit = regression 
error (residuals = earnings management).
For better operationalization of the independent 
variables mentioned in equation 1, a construct was 
elaborated (Table 2) with the respective variables used 
and operationalization of these.
1
2
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Table 2 Study construct 
Variables
Operacionalization Authors
Independent variables
DEGREE_C
Number of direct links that a board member 
has with the other board members in a network, 
obtained using the UCINET®6 software.
Carrera (2013), 
Ribeiro and Colauto (2016).
BTWN_C
Number of indirect links that a board member 
has with the other board members in a network, 
obtained using the UCINET®6 software.
Independent control variables
INDEP
Number of external members in relation to 
total members on a board of directors.
Bruére (2010), 
Carrera (2013), 
Chiu et al. (2013), 
Santos and Silveira (2007), 
Shi et al. (2013).
DUALCEO 
Dummy variable: 1 when the positions of chief executive 
offi cer (CEO) and chairman of the board are occupied by 
different people and 0 if occupied by the same person.
Carrera (2013), 
Chiu et al. (2013), 
Martinez (2001), 
Shi et al. (2013).
SIZE Number of board members (size of the board).
Carrera (2013), 
Chiu et al. (2013), 
Martinez (2001), 
Silveira, Barros, and Fama (2003).
COMPENS Log of total board remuneration in relation to total members. Mindzak (2013).
MEET Number of annual board meetings.
Carrera (2013), 
Mindzak (2013).
FIRM_SIZE Log of total assets.
Carrera (2013), 
Chiu et al. (2013), 
Mindzak (2013), 
Shi et al.(2013).
GOV
Level 1, Level 2, New Market, and Traditional, in which 1, 2, 3, 
and 4 are attributed to each level of governance, respectively.
Carrera (2013), 
Chiu et al. (2013), 
Mindzak (2013), 
Shi et al.(2013).
SECTOR
1: oil, gas, and biofuels sector
2: basic materials sector
3: industrial goods sector
4: construction and transport sector
5: non-cyclical consumption sector
6: cyclical consumption sector
7: information technology sector
8: telecommunications sector 
9: public utility sector
Martinez (2008).
BTWN_C: intermediation centrality; COMPENS: total board remuneration; DEGREE_C: degree centrality; DUALCEO: CEO 
duality; FIRM_SIZE: size; GOV: level of corporate governance; INDEP: board independence; MEET: number of annual board 
meetings; SECTOR: company economic sector; SIZE: board size.
Source: Developed by the authors.
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3.3 Data Collection and Analysis
Th e data for the variables in equations 1 and 2 were 
gathered from Reference Forms and by consulting the 
Economática® database. Specifi cally in order to identify 
the boards of directors, the information contained in the 
Reference Forms available on the BM&FBOVESPA website 
were used. In the Reference Form for each company, 
the eﬀ ective members of the boards were identifi ed for 
each year studied, in order to enable identifi cation of 
the formation of company networks via board member 
interlocking. Subsequently, with the help of an electronic 
spreadsheet, quadratic form matrices were created to 
assist in identifying connections between companies. 
Aft er creating the matrices, the UCINET®6 soft ware was 
used to form the social networks and identify the degree 
of centrality and intermediation of the companies.
In order to compose the variables used in the KS Model 
(equation 2) of earnings management, all the variables 
were gathered from the Economática® database, and for 
the control variables, the Reference Forms, Economática® 
database, and BM&FBOVESPA were analyzed. Table 3 
specifi es the items analyzed for each control variable.
Table 3 Collection of control variable data
Variables Data collection source
Board independence Item 12.6/8 of the Reference Form
Chief Executive Offi cer duality Item 12.6/8 of the Reference Form
Size of board Item 13.2 of the Reference Form
Total board remuneration Item 13.2 of the Reference Form
Number of annual board meetings Item 13.4 of the Reference Form and company websites
Size of assets Economática®
Level of corporate governance BM&FBOVESPA website
Economic sector BM&FBOVESPA website
BM&FBOVESPA = São Paulo Stock, Commodities, and Futures Exchange.
Source: Developed by the authors.
For the panel data regression analysis, two stages were 
carried out. Th e fi rst involved applying multiple linear 
regression for the KS Model of earnings management 
metric in order to identify the level of company accruals in 
each year of the study, using the SPSS® 21.0 soft ware. In the 
second stage, aft er identifying board member interlocking 
in 246 companies, the UCINET®6 soft ware was used to 
characterize the networks and identify the measures of 
centrality of degree and intermediation. Aft er these two 
stages, the panel data regression was carried out, for which 
the Stata®13.0 soft ware was used.
4. DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS
Th is section presents the results regarding the infl uence 
of earnings management and measures of centrality based 
on the panel data regression statistical technique. Th e 
panel data regression analysis method is similar to that 
used by Carrera (2013), Mendes-Da-Silva, Rossoni, Martin 
and Martelanc (2008), and Ribeiro and Colauto (2016). 
In order for it to be possible to carry out the two 
regressions and best identify the infl uence of interlocking 
and earnings management, the positive and negative 
accrual results were separated by year and by activity 
sector, resulting in 261 companies with positive accruals 
and 327 with negative accruals over the three years and 
totaling 588 observations in the analysis period, as 
observed in Table 4.
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By observing Table 4 it can be seen that in 2011 the 
construction and transport and cyclical consumption 
sectors present the greatest number of companies with 
positive accruals. In 2012, the non-cyclical consumption 
sector is included, and the companies also presented a 
tendency for positive earnings management. Analyzing 
2013, it can be observed that the result is the same as that 
found in 2011, in which the construction and transport 
and cyclical consumption sectors presented the greatest 
number of companies with positive earnings management, 
observed via discretionary accruals.
It is thus verifi ed that the construction and transport 
and cyclical consumption sectors were the ones that 
maintained positive earnings management practices over 
the period analyzed.
When negative earnings management practices are 
observed, a similar result to positive earnings practices is 
found with regards to the sectors. In 2011, the public utility 
sector features with the greatest number of companies with 
negative earnings practices, followed by the construction 
and transport and consumption sectors. Th is picture is 
repeated in 2012. However, for 2013 the public utility 
and construction and transport sectors remain and the 
non-cyclical consumption sector is one of the sectors 
with the greater negative earnings management practices. 
With the KS Model, it is generally noted that, 
independent of operating sector, the companies manage 
their earnings from one year to another; however, Table 
4 shows that in the three years analyzed, the companies 
sought to report more losses and negatively managed 
their earnings. 
Subsequent to this analysis, two panel data regressions 
were carried out, in which the fi rst refers to positive 
accruals and the second to negative accruals, both relating 
board interlocking and the other control variables in order 
to test the hypotheses established in the study. Th e results 
of these regressions are shown in Table 5.
Table 4 Discretionary accruals separated into positive and negative  
Sector
2011 2012 2013
Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative
Oil, gas, and biofuels 1 1 1 2 2 1
Basic materials 14 4 7 13 13 8
Industrial goods 10 7 9 10 8 11
Construction and transport 16 19 17 23 19 20
Non-cyclical consumption 14 7 13 11 10 15
Cyclical consumption 16 17 13 22 22 13
Information technology 0 3 1 3 3 1
Telecommunications 2 4 6 0 2 3
Public utility 14 36 11 40 17 33
Total companies 87 98 78 124 96 105
Source: Developed by the authors.
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In Table 5, it is statistically observed that accruals are 
not infl uenced by the variables degree centrality (positive 
accruals), intermediation centrality (negative accruals), 
size of assets (negative accruals), independence (positive 
accruals), size of board (positive and negative accruals), 
and number of board meetings (positive accruals). Along 
with these results, and in order to give more robustness 
to the fi ndings (Wooldridge, 2010), the assumptions 
tests were verified for both the regression models. 
Th e results confi rmed all of the normality of residuals 
assumptions, homoskedasticity, serial autocorrelation, 
and multicollinearity. It also bears mentioning that no 
variable is strongly correlated with the accruals measures, 
thus confi rming that the parameter estimation model 
is robust and underpinning the results from the study. 
As expected and similar to the result from Carrera 
(2013), it is noted from Table 5 that degree (DEGREE_C) 
and intermediation (BTWN_C) centralities exert an 
influence on earnings management practices, both 
for positive and for negative accruals. With regards to 
positive accruals, degree centrality (DEGREE_C) is 
statistically signifi cant (ߚመ   = 0.0365; p < 0.05), suggesting 
that the greater the degree centrality, the greater the 
positive earnings management, which means that the 
most central companies aim to positively manage their 
earnings via their board members. Th is suggests that 
positive earnings management practices in companies are 
directly perpetuated by other companies via their board 
members. For Carrera (2013), the greater the degree 
centrality (DEGREE_C), the greater the level of variation 
Table 5 Earnings management: positive and negative accrual panel data
Variables
Regression 1
Positive accruals
Regression 2
Negative accruals
Coeffi cient Standard error t statistic Coeffi cient Standard error t statistic
 DEGREE_C 0.0365* 0.0117 3.11 1.0285 0.7170 1.43
 BTWN_C 0.2231** 0.0670 3.33 0.3029** 0.0351 8.61
 FIRM_SIZE -0.0178 0.0206 -0.87 0.0590** 0.0082 7.19
 GOV 0.0040 0.0028 1.45 -0.0010 0.0867 -0.01
 SECTOR 0.2488 0.1631 1.53 -0.3325 0.6380 -0.52
 INDEP 0.6139** 0.1924 3.19 0.3190 0.4514 0.71
 SIZE -0.0067** 0.0170 -0.39 0.0935* 0.0509 1.84
 DUALCEO -0.0800 0.0805 -0.99 0.0079 0.2781 0.03
 MEET -0.0157* 0.0076 -2.07 0.0186 0.0171 1.09
 COMPENS -0.0267 0.0602 -0.44 0.1172 0.2268 0.52
Constant 0.1483 1.2889 0.12 2.0015 4.0680 0.49
R² adjusted 39.19 61.03
F statistic
(probability)
5.67
(0.0000)
20.68
(0.0000)
Observations 261 327
Note: The Breusch-Pagan and Hausman tests were carried out to better characterize the estimation model. The Breusch-Pagan 
test rejected hypothesis (H0) for both models, positive (sig. = 0.001) and negative (sig. = 0.001) accruals, concluding that 
the Random Effects Model is superior to the POLS model. The Hausman test concluded with the rejection of hypothesis (H0) 
and the superiority of the Fixed Effects Model compared with the Random Effects Model, for both models with positive and 
negative accruals (both with sig. = 0.000). Thus, the best estimation model is Fixed Effects, presented in this table. To calculate 
the negative accruals model the sign was not disregarded; positive relationships must indicate that the greater the value of the 
variable, the lower the negative accrual score, and for negative relationships, the relationship is the opposite. For the models, 
the existence of endogeneity between the test variables [degree centrality (DEGREE_C), intermediation centrality (BTWN_C)] 
and accruals was veri ed. The models were estimated via 2SLS and then the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test was applied, giving the 
following results: for positive accruals endogenous variable DEGREE_CP-value(0.01) = 1.00 and BTWN_CP-value(0.01) = 1.00; 
for negative accruals endogenous variable DEGREE_CP-value(4.30) = 0.8286, BTWN_CP-value(4.20) = 0.8383. Thus, in all of 
the cases, hypothesis H0, for which there is no difference between the OLS and 2SLS estimations, cannot be rejected, and it is 
concluded that no endogenous effect exists. The best estimation is still OLS. 
BTW_C = number of indirect links that a board member has with the other board members in a network, obtained using the 
UCINET®6 software; COMPENS = log of total board remuneration in relation to the total number of members; DEGREE_C = number 
of direct links that a board member has with the other board members in a network, obtained using the UCINET®6 software; 
DUALCEO = chief executive offi cer (CEO) duality (dummy variable in which in company i the CEO is also the chairman of the 
board); FIRM_SIZE = size of assets (log of total assets); GOV = level of governance (Level 1, 2, New Market, and Traditional); INDEP 
= board independence (number of external members in relation to total board members); MEET = number of annual board meetings; 
SECTOR = economic sector (divided into nine sectors, as in the construct); SIZE = size of board (number of board members).
*, **: signifi cant to 5% and 1%, respectively.
Source: Developed by the authors.
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in accruals, and according to the results from the study, 
as degree centrality increases, companies are more likely 
to positively manage their earnings. 
With regards to intermediation centrality, this is 
statistically signifi cant (ߚመ  = 0.2231 and ߚመ  = 0.3029; p < 0.01)
 in relation to positive and negative earnings management, 
indicating that indirect ties between companies, through 
board members, have an infl uence on company earnings 
quality. In this case, it is noted that positive and negative 
earnings management practices are indirectly perpetuated 
between companies via common board members in 
diﬀ erent companies. Th e results are similar to those in 
the study from Ribeiro and Colauto (2016), who also 
identifi ed a statistically positive relationship between 
intermediation centrality of board members and income 
smoothing practices, and hence the probability of 
companies managing their earnings. 
As a limitation in this study, it is important to highlight 
the possible presence of endogeneity in the relationship 
observed between board interlocking variables and 
earnings management, given that board characteristics, 
such as the presence of institutional investors, big banks, 
and government itself, may be infl uencing both earnings 
management practices and board connections. Th ese 
board member characteristics were not investigated in this 
study, thus presenting an opportunity for further study. 
Positive variations in accruals, as presented in Table 5, are 
statistically infl uenced (ߚመ  = 0.6139 and ߚመ  = -0.0067; p < 0.05)
by the independence (INDEP) and size of boards, 
respectively. With regards to board independence, it is 
noted that the greater the independence, the greater the 
positive variations in accruals, as these are not statistically 
related with negative variations in accruals.
With regards to board size, the results shown indicate 
that, as size decreases, there are indications of positive 
earnings management, and that increases in the number 
of board members are statistically (ߚመ   = 0.0935; p < 0.01) 
related with negative variations in earnings. Similar to 
Chiu et al. (2013) and Ribeiro and Colauto (2016), the 
results indicate that reductions or increases in the number 
of board members are statistically related with earnings 
management practices. 
Also with regards to positive variations in accruals, it 
is verifi ed via Table 5 that the number of board meetings 
(MEET) is statistically (ߚመ  = -0.0157; p < 0.01) related 
with positive earnings management practices. According 
to Elouaer-Mrizak and Chastand (2013), meetings 
are the time that board members have for face to face 
conversation. For Carrera (2013), the number of board 
meetings has a positive impact on earnings quality. Th us, 
while degree centrality exerts an infl uence on positive 
accruals and intermediation centrality is related to positive 
and negative variations, it is believed that, via board 
interlocking, accounting practices and valuable private 
information can be shared (Carrera, 2013).
With regards to negative variations in accruals, the 
size of assets variable is statistically (ߚመ  = 0.0590; p < 0.01) 
related with negative variations in earnings. Th e results 
indicate similarity with the results from Carrera (2013), 
Chiu et al. (2013), and Ribeiro and Colauto (2016), which 
suggest that negative earnings management is related with 
company size, measured by assets. 
Th e results from this study indicate that there is no 
statistically signifi cant relationship between earnings 
management and board remuneration (COMPENS) and 
operating sector variables, which is similar to Carrera 
(2013), and also the case for CEO duality (Shi et al., 2013) 
and level of governance (GOV) (Erfh uth & Bezerra, 2013).
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5. CONCLUSION
Th e aim of this study was to verify the infl uence of 
board interlocking on earnings management in companies 
listed on the BM&FBOVESPA. Interlocking of board 
members was measured via degree centrality and 
intermediation centrality. A descriptive, documentary, 
and quantitative study was carried out, with a sample 
comprising 185 companies in 2011, 202 in 2012, and 
201 in 2013, which varied depending on data availability. 
Th e results indicate that earnings management can be 
infl uenced by board member interlocking.
Earnings management, measured using the KS 
Model (1995), indicated positive or negative earnings 
management behavior. It was found that the greater 
the social network directly established between board 
members, the greater the positive earnings management, 
which supports the fi ndings of Carrera (2013).
Positive and also negative earnings management 
behavior can be observed via intermediation centrality; 
that is, when such management behavior is indirectly 
spread between companies via the same members sitting 
on diﬀ erent company boards. Th ese results are similar to 
those from Ribeiro and Colauto (2016), who identifi ed 
a positive connection between intermediation centrality 
and income smoothing in New Market companies. Th e 
results indicate that, despite intermediation centrality 
infl uencing positive and negative earnings management, 
the greatest variation occurs in relation to negative 
earnings management. 
Besides fi nding infl uences of board interlocking on 
earnings management, it was verifi ed that accruals are 
also infl uenced by size of assets (negative accruals), 
independence (positive accruals), size of board (positive 
and negative accruals), and number of board meetings 
(positive accruals).
It is thus highlighted that the greater a board’s 
independence, the greater the positive variation in 
accruals, which is in line with the fi ndings of Bruére 
(2010), Carrera (2013), and Mizruchi (1996). When 
board size is observed, the results indicate that when 
there is a reduction in size, there are indications of positive 
earnings management. On the other hand, when board 
size increases, there is a negative variation in earnings. 
Th ese results for the size of board variable are similar to 
those from Chiu et al. (2013). Th e number of meetings 
is also related with earnings management, since it was 
identifi ed that a reduction in the number of meetings 
increases positive accruals, which is consistent with 
Carrera (2013).
In terms of a new contribution from the article to the 
area of study, convergence with the results of international 
studies stands out, especially by using the KS Model of 
earnings management, which had not yet been verifi ed in 
the Brazilian context. Other studies fi nd this relationship 
between board interlocking and earnings management 
via other management metrics, such as the modifi ed 
Jones model (Carrera, 2013) and income smoothing 
(Ribeiro & Colauto, 2016). Th is result reinforces the idea 
that earnings management behavior can be perpetuated 
via board members who sit on the boards of diﬀ erent 
companies. 
It bears mentioning that this perpetuation of behavior 
via boards of directors can reinforce earnings management 
practices involving capital market related motivations, 
contractual motivations between companies and 
stakeholders, government regulations (Healy & Wahlen, 
1999), and political costs (Martinez, 2001). Th is can have 
regulatory implications that inhibit the eﬀ ect of this 
sharing of information due to the centrality that a board 
member exerts in a network of relationships, with some 
regulations restricting the number of boards on which 
a board member can sit at the same time. Th e Brazilian 
Institute for Corporate Governance (2010) advises that 
these participations on diﬀ erent boards should be analyzed 
from the perspective of avoiding confl icts of interest and 
verifying whether board members have enough time to 
adequately carry out their activities.
One limitation of the study involves the possible 
existence of endogeneity between the board interlocking 
and earnings management variables, as the presence of 
institutional investors, big banks, and government itself 
on boards could infl uence both motivations for practicing 
EM and the confi guration of board connections itself, thus 
presenting an  opportunity for further research.
Also for future research, we suggest applying other 
earnings management models identifi ed in the literature, 
which could be applied in diﬀ erent countries, such as the 
modifi ed Jones model (Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1995), 
which is quite widely used in the international literature. 
We also recommend that based on the construct of this 
study it is also possible to use other statistical measures 
to measure the relationship between board interlocking 
and earnings management. Clusters and rankings are 
some of the measures that could possibly be used. 
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